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# NATO-EU Cooperation in Post-Conflict Reconstruction

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NATO Defense College

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### Research Paper

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## Editorial

**L**essons learned from recent NATO peace support operations show how important and multifaceted are these multinational and multi-institutional endeavors. The famous 4 C's in these situations are the key operational factors: coherence, compatibility, coordination and cooperation. The question is how well all the different actors work together on the ground, whether from governmental or multilateral agencies or from the non-governmental community, especially during lengthy and demanding post-conflict reconstruction activities.

These sensitive questions were addressed in depth during two seminars organized recently by researchers of the NATO Defense College with different partners. The objectives were to define more precisely operational and conceptual aspects of NATO/EU cooperation firstly and NATO/Russia perspectives for joint action secondly. As a matter of fact, the EU and Russia are for the Atlantic Alliance the two main actors and partners that engaged with NATO forces in the stabilisation process in the Balkans. Starting from this common experience, the Academic Research Branch conducted debates on cooperation issues with various experts from diverse perspectives.

On NATO/EU cooperation the question was primarily to study post-conflict operations and to explore reconstruction goals and achievements. Referring to experiences from the Balkans and Afghanistan, including the critical topic of narcotics, experts discussed the sensitive questions of how to plan and organize for reconstruction and make progress toward a desirable end state. This was the basis for insights on NATO/EU cooperation, including the current limits and the possible future based on bottom-up achievements.

On NATO/Russia, the question was much more to rethink how to combine the different experiences from Russian and NATO forces in order to define a common foundation and to be able to work together in joint peace support operations. The conceptual, technical, operational, and political aspects of these joint actions were explored and addressed with Russian colleagues.

Summaries of the key findings from these debates are offered below in this Research paper.

*Jean DUFOURCQ, Chief Academic Research Branch*

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# NATO-EU Cooperation in Post-Conflict Reconstruction

David YOST<sup>1</sup>

On 3-4 November 2005 the NATO Defense College hosted a seminar, co-sponsored by the Ministry of Defense of Finland, regarding NATO and European Union post-conflict reconstruction operations. The participants included officials from NATO and the EU, as well as experts and officials from NATO, EU, and Partnership for Peace nations. The seminar objectives included:

- promoting more effective EU-NATO cooperation in such operations,
- evaluating the main problems and achievements of such operations to date, and
- assessing lessons from operations in Afghanistan in particular.

## 1. Reconstruction goals and achievements

The goals in reconstruction and stabilization operations include security, economic recovery, social well-being, justice and reconciliation, and public participation in governance. These goals are interdependent – for example, establishing the rule of law promotes economic recovery. The first imperative remains security vis à vis internal and external threats. After the achievement of a minimal level of security, other goals may be pursued, from humanitarian relief to self-sustaining governance under the rule of law. As one participant observed, “Security sector reform is the key element of the exit strategy.”

Participants acknowledged that reconstruction operations over the past decade have genuine achievements to their credit. Much has been accomplished in terms of physical infrastructure reconstruction in the Balkans, and the December 2001 Bonn agenda for Afghanistan has been successfully completed, and for the most part on time.

The definition of the “end-state” of reconstruction operations is elusive. One participant maintained that a multi-year plan, such as the Bonn agenda for Afghanistan, is a more practical method of formulating guidelines for action than trying to define an ultimate end-state. Indeed, social, economic, and political changes requiring a generation or more may be necessary to establish solid foundations for peace between former belligerents.

Some participants suggested that NATO and the EU should not undertake a military intervention without giving more thought to how to achieve desired end-states and to how combat operations (for instance, the targets destroyed, such as bridges) may affect subsequent reconstruction operations. One participant referred to an “effectiveness-legitimacy dilemma” for military commanders: that is, enough force must be used to ensure security and order, but excessive force could undermine the legitimacy and authority of the protecting power.

## 2. Planning and organizing for reconstruction

Bureaucratic resistance, including within military services, to what one speaker called “the bottomless pit of problems” in

stabilization and reconstruction operations has deterred some national agencies from accepting responsibility for such operations even in some of the largest NATO and EU countries. This has led nations to define interagency mechanisms and to consider establishing agencies dedicated to the function. The United Kingdom’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit, which consists of about 30 people, was recently created by the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Department for International Development.

## 3. NATO-EU cooperation

According to one participant, at meetings of the North Atlantic Council and the European Union’s Political and Security Committee the only agreed agenda item involving reconstruction to date has been Bosnia, and even these discussions have been less than fully satisfactory. There has been no formal NATO-EU discussion about operations in Darfur at the NAC-PSC level. The EU and NATO are providing support to the African Union, one participant noted, “independently, but in parallel and in close consultation.” In both organizations, a participant observed, “capitals are very much in the driver’s seat,” and some nations have created “a deadlock” inhibiting improved high-level NATO-EU cooperation. The most positive NATO-EU interface has remained at the “bottom-up” grass-roots working level, where staff of the two organizations have on some occasions created *faits accomplis* (for instance, cease-fire agreements in southern Serbia) that their superiors have accepted.

Some participants noted that the “Berlin Plus” arrangements, as adopted in March 2003, provide for assured EU access to NATO operational planning capabilities and for the availability of NATO capabilities and common assets, such as headquarters and communications units, for EU-led operations. The clearest example is Operation Althea in Bosnia, an EU-led operation run by SHAPE and DSACEUR. In view of this precedent, one participant asked, would it be possible to envisage a “Berlin Plus-Plus” arrangement, whereby the EU would provide support to NATO with the EU’s economic and civilian assets? The reply from other participants was that such an arrangement is unlikely in formal terms, but that there have been some positive signs. In October 2005 the European Commission informally asked NATO for advice as to which Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan could benefit from EU funding. Flexible solutions may be the way forward. EU police training could, for example, be run from a NATO-led PRT.

## 4. Continuing challenges in Afghanistan

Several participants underscored the gravity of the challenges facing Afghanistan after 25 years of war. As one participant noted, the country is fifth from the bottom on the Human Development Index, with an annual income of \$200 per person. Afghanistan’s economy still requires transportation and communication infrastructure. The country has no railroads, and its airports and roads are inadequate.

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One participant described the division of labor in Afghanistan approximately as follows: security sector reform (NATO), governance (NATO and the EU), development and reconstruction (EU), stability and security (NATO), and the economy (EU). NATO-EU coordination in Afghanistan has derived mainly from NATO leadership. NATO has chaired monthly meetings of NATO officials with EU and Japanese representatives. In contrast, EU officials have met only with fellow EU officials, except for sometimes inviting Canadian and Norwegian representatives to their meetings.

According to one participant, 63 per cent of the world's heroin and opium originates in Afghanistan. The obstacles to suppressing the narcotics business include "pervasive" corruption and inadequate forces to combat the drug traffickers and illegal armed groups. Combating the narcotics industry will require strengthening the special counter-narcotics police force in Afghanistan.

The geographical expansion of the area of responsibility of NATO-led PRTs may soon lead the International Security Assistance Force and at least some PRTs to face combat. Among other issues, this will raise the question of how to deal with detained captives.

### 5. NATO's problems in reconstruction operations

NATO's efforts in support of reconstruction have consisted above all of operations to restore security. NATO is not a reconstruction agency, and there is no NATO equivalent to the EU's European Agency for Reconstruction. Once a secure environment for reconstruction activities has been established, NATO's role can be expected to diminish.

The definition of NATO policy depends on consensus, but there has been a persistent dispute among the allies about the legitimacy of NATO involvement in stabilization and reconstruction operations. Some hold that such operations are a task for the EU. Staff work on a NATO policy statement on reconstruction has nonetheless continued, and NATO's efforts in support of reconstruction operations in the field have been successful. As with challenges such as organized crime and trafficking in human beings, forces in the field have at times had to make decisions in the absence of an agreed NATO policy.

Another significant problem facing NATO authorities resides in the caveats on the types of activities that the forces of specific nations will undertake. As one participant put it, some Allies are "cherry-picking" the "soft end" tasks in order to minimize the exposure of their troops to danger. This approach is not helpful to Alliance cohesion and solidarity.

## Prospects for NATO-Russia Joint Peace Support Operations

Lionel PONSARD<sup>1</sup>

On 10-11 October 2005, the NATO Defense College and the Moscow Center for Political and International Studies (CPIS) co-organized in Moscow a Workshop on "Prospects for NATO-Russia Joint Peace Support Operations". The primary objectives of this seminar aimed at addressing challenges facing both NATO and Russia in conducting joint peace support operations; brainstorming the nature and/or character of future possible NATO-Russia joint peace support operations; and exploring what instruments could be used to increase the interoperability for joint peace support operations of NATO and Russian forces.

The key findings of this Workshop read as follows:

- Crisis management cannot be the responsibility of just one international body. We should improve common work and coordination among different organizations and institutions with different expertise and comparative advantages. Two or more institutions should work together, thereby bringing a greater combination of pressures and incentives for the resolution of crises. Further development of their interaction would improve the overall mechanism of a peace support operation where organizations are assigned certain roles. In this context, we should also try to provide constructive answers to the questions of legitimacy and impartiality, taking into account the fact that the possible absence of a UN mandate for NATO operations has the potential to damage NATO's relations with Russia.
- Areas for cooperation should be carefully identified. Although

we might consider a broader geographic zone for NATO-Russia joint peace support operations, a general opposition from the Russian side is to be expected for any NATO role in the resolution of crises in the CIS region.

- It is essential to consolidate and to optimize the available mechanisms such as the "Generic Concept for Joint NATO-Russia Peacekeeping Operations", which represents an excellent basis for further cooperation. Nevertheless, we should consider the possibility to elaborate a common NATO-Russia integrated doctrine for joint peace support operations. The Berlin Plus Arrangements between NATO and the EU could even serve as a useful technical example. This integrated doctrine would offer a common NATO-Russia assessment of risks and challenges and pave the way for a common reflection on important issues such as the operating environment. The current multi-dimensional operating environment requires indeed a flexible response approach. In this respect, cooperation should be implemented on the basis of shared responsibility and coordination mechanisms should be carefully designed. Mutual trust will only consolidate if NATO can prove to Russia that it can go beyond political statements, but also if Russia can prove to NATO that it is a reliable partner. In the same vein, we should not only envisage operations that are merely in the interest of one of the two parties.
- Mutual understanding is often hampered by the language problem. This problem, technical from the one side, strongly

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constrains cooperation between Russia's and NATO's representatives. In this respect, the NATO-Russia Glossary of Contemporary Political and Military Terms can be considered as an encouraging example. This kind of endeavors also allows the partners to identify their differences of understanding more easily.

- There is a need to raise the public awareness of NATO in Russia, change the Alliance's image in the Russian mind, and ensure that these efforts are made in cooperation with the Russian leadership. This would put us in a position to explain to the Russian public opinion why NATO-Russia cooperation is mandatory in the field of peace support operations, especially since this area runs high in the whole spectrum of NATO-Russia activities. Lectures, conferences, seminars and discussions sponsored jointly by NATO representatives and Russian public / political organizations prove to be highly effective. A huge amount of work has already been done, but also by the different NATO bodies in Moscow, and by NATO's educational institutions such as the NATO School and the NATO Defense College. Those initiatives should be pursued and intensified.

#### Specific Comments

- Several participants underscored recurrent Russian complains

about the absence of recognition for their actual capabilities in peace-support operations and the lack of balanced cooperation. Common concerns suffer from paradoxes, contradictions, and protests. Major remarks included a) Russian operations on the territory of the Newly Independent States (NIS) with a CIS mandate should not be systematically questioned in the West; b) little acceptance among Russian public opinion for NATO-Russia joint operations, particularly on the territory of the NIS – joint operations are perceived as more acceptable in the case of a UN mandate, with the EU as a strategic partner, or in a G8 framework;

- Some experts also noted the Russian insistence on the role to be granted to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and more globally on CIS structures. In their view, the Russian side would like to see NATO recognizing the CSTO as an effective security provider and as an appropriate framework for conducting peace support operations in coalition format;
- In very practical terms, some participants mentioned the Russian suggestion to develop a "common early warning structure" with the objective to establish a shared responsibility and to pave the way for a future strategic planning process.

## NDC RESEARCH ACTIVITIES

### INTERNAL ACTIVITIES

1<sup>st</sup> December 2005

**Transforming NATO 2006: The Political Agenda**, Seminar organized by the NATO Defense College, Rome.

**David YOST**

Panel Chair, NATO-EU Seminar on "Post-Conflict Reconstruction", NDC, 3-4 November 2005, Rome, Italy

Lecture on "NATO: History, Structure and Relationship to the United Nations" for the Modular Short Course on Global Security Challenges, NDC, 7 November 2005, Rome, Italy.

### EXTERNAL ACTIVITIES

**Laure BORGOMANO-LOUP**

Lecture on "Religion and State", Bar Ilan University, 4-5 December 2005, Tel Aviv, Israel.

Lecture on "La transformation des conflits: les guerres asymétriques", université de Paris Sud, Mastère de Diplomatie, 12 December 2005, Paris, France.

Lecture on "Réflexions sur la médiation internationale", université de Paris Sud, Mastère de Diplomatie, 12 December 2005, Paris, France.

**Jean DUFORCQ**

Lecture on "Le courage d'être chef: pensée et action", 10<sup>ème</sup> académie des entrepreneurs, 19 November 2005, Rome, Italy.

**Carlo MASALA**

Participation in a Seminar on *Transformation*, Naval Post-graduate School, 3-18 December 2005, Monterey, United States.

**David YOST**

Lecture on "La politique de l'OTAN en Méditerranée", Research Talks with

Morocco, Ministère marocain des Affaires étrangères, 15 November 2005, Rabat, Morocco.

Attendance to the Conference on "Nuclear Non-Proliferation: What Next After the NPT Review?", Wilton Park, 12-16 December 2005, UK.

### External Publications

**Jean DUFORCQ**

"Vademecum stratégique", *Revue Défense*, No. 117, Sept/Oct 2005.

"L'altérité comme facteur stratégique", *Défense Nationale*, décembre 2005.

**Lionel PONSARD and David YOST**, "Is it Time to Update NATO's Strategic Concept?", *NATO Review*, Autumn 2005,

<<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue3/english/debate.html> >

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